Over the last decades, the buy-back contract model in Iran’s petroleum industry was a valuable tool that kept evolving over the last 3 generations. Despite its significance, it was always faced with heavy criticism. After the sanctions against Iran and the occurrence of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, there was a crucial need of international investment by joining foreign investors and contractors on behalf of the host government. Thus, there was a vital need for an enhanced model contract, after changes in laws, allowing this agreement. Because most of Iran’s current reservoirs have been depleted, it is essential to do sustainable exploit with a maximum efficient rate of recovery including prioritizing use of shared reservoirs. This has led to the enactment of a new model of oil and gas contracts called IPC. This new model has its own flaws especially in FISCAL REGIMEs and is faced with criticism. This paper attempts to analyze and respond to these critical reviews. Although there are some gaps in the model, it can pave the way for advancement of economic and FISCAL REGIMEs leading to further foreign investments, in hopes of strengthening Iran’s position in OPEC and world trade of oil and gas for long-term.

A survey of the variety of contractual systems in the oil industry shows that countries across the world use different exploration and development contracts in their oil fields. However, oil and gas industry is covered with three contractual systems (Concession, Product Sharing Contracts (PSC) and Service Contracts) and exploration and exploitation activities of projects are assigned by these systems. This notwithstanding, if we review the contract items and elements, we can understand a wide variety of contractual systems. Based on this analysis and evidence, projects with same conditions may have different FISCAL REGIMEs. Therefore, with this interpretation, financial, technical and legal issues are significant factors in contractual system. Based on contract's name, an impartial judgment could not be made. In this article, FISCAL REGIME in product sharing agreements are explained and analyzed. Thereafter, it is shown how threshold and trigger effect the government and investors take. Finally, FISCAL REGIME factors and their influence on oil and gas project return will be explained.

The gas shortage in the winter of 2020, as well as the supply-demand mismatch in the coming years, will require investment in gas field development along with demand-side management policies. The National Iranian Oil Company's internal financial resources are insufficient for the development of gas fields due to the company's low share of oil and gas sales profits, and it requires to attract investors through risky service contracts. The high capital cost of developing particular fields, including the low richness-low condensate-of the produced gas, prevents complete repayment from exported condensate, especially in the case of sanctions with a 50% cost recovery cap. Consequently, IPC contract modeling was used to examine five major parameters affecting the gas field development economy: capital cost, quality of gas produced, condensate rice, cost recovery cap, and natural gas price. The proposed financial relationship is provided by picking the ideal value of the two parameters of the cost recovery and gas price for a combination of three additional factors.

One of the most important areas that can have a significant impact on maximizing the country's national interests in the policy sector is the type of financial relationship between the oil industry (the National Oil Company on behalf of the oil industry) and the government. It is also a tool for the government to intervene and make policies that can play a significant role in the commercial performance of the National Oil Company. On the other hand, regulation is one of the main components of energy governance, which in coordination with other components can ensure the proper functioning of the upstream oil and gas sector. In the present research, by collecting a set of necessary information for the pathology of the regulation system of the Iran oil and gas upstream and the financial relationship of the government with the National Oil Company through library studies, comparative studies and interviews with experts in the field of energy and scenarios of transitioning from the current situation to the desired situation was compiled by the expert panel and validated and finalized by the expert panel. In the first stage, it is suggested that the Plateau 1 scenario, which is the preservation of the National Oil Company under the Ministry of Oil and the transformation of the headquarters of this company into the upstream regulator of oil and gas, and the conclusion of development and exploitation contracts by this regulatory body with governmental and non-governmental exploration and production companies is to be implemented and gradually after the complete separation of the governance layers from each other move the peak scenario (optimal situation) could be achieved.

After nearly three decades since the conclusion and implementation of Buyback contracts in the oil and gas industry in Iran, objections to this contract, particularly from the perspective of foreign investors has been revealed. Failure to allocate a share of the produced oil and gas to foreign investors and subsequently discussing possibility of reserve recognition, short terms of Buybacks and non participation of oil companies in production period, non admissibility of Buybacks FISCAL system for foreign investors and the Iranian content are among many challenges which have been set forth by contractors. In order to solve such problems and attract expertise and financial resources to the Iranian oil and gas projects, a new petroleum contract has been introduced by Iran, the so-called Iranian Petroleum Contract (IPC). The present article will comparatively analyze Buyback and IPC in three aspects naming ownership, reservoir recognition and FISCAL REGIME and will conclude that under IPC, the same as Buyback, ownership of petroleum in situ and produced oil and gas vest by the government. Also, IPC’ s contractor, the same as the contractor under the Buyback, is able to recognize oil and gas reserves in accordance with the PRMS guideline, and its FISCAL REGIME although in some areas has been improved, some objections can be raised.

FISCAL REGIME is one of the main differences between petroleum contracts. FISCAL REGIMEs in oil contracts are divided to two main categories namely Concessionary and Contractual Systems. In contractual systems, the main difference between service and production sharing contracts is the way of compensation of contractor services which could be in cash or in kind. In production sharing contracts the contractor receives a portion of produced oil. One of the main criteria to compare FISCAL REGIMEs is government and contractor takes in real values. Comparing the net present value of contractor take shows that it could have been more desirable and cost effective to use production sharing contract in Iranian Azadegan oil field instead of Buy-Back.

This paper aims to explain the real-FISCAL linkages by identifying the macroeconomic determinants of government revenue in Iran. To achieve this, the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) method was applied using data from 1972 to 2020. The findings indicate that inflation, centralization, the divergence of public prices from market prices, and the concentration of tax collection on labor income tax all have positive effects on government revenue in Iran. In contrast, economic growth and trade openness have negative effects on government revenue. Overall, these findings support implementing an economic growth strategy that is internally comprehensive within the tax system and externally coherent in terms of the economics of growth, and to which the government has a “tight commitment”. “Internally comprehensive” refers to establishing a mature progressive tax system that includes an inflation-adjusted comprehensive income tax along with automatic complete indexation. When complete and explicit automatic indexation is lacking, FISCAL authorities may still benefit from inflation, which can lead to persistent political incentives for inflation inertia. “Externally coherent” refers to ensuring that aspects such as openness, decentralization of macro-FISCAL decision-making, and the efficient size of government align with the comprehensive tax system to promote economic growth.

FISCAL REGIME governing contracts is one of the main aspects of differences between petroleum contracts with each other. To design a suitable FISCAL REGIME, economic considerations are on the top of priority. Comparing Buy-Back contracts with new Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) shows that Buy-Back contracts have intrinsic problems such as being short term, having a disintegrated chain of production, faulty tax system and having cost based FISCAL system. While IPC is long-term contracts with an integrated chain of production and the contractor has an incentive for cost saving (but with the same faulty tax system). On the other hand, comparing the net present value of contractor take shows that IPC could have been more desirable and cost-effective in Azadegan oil field than Buy-Back contracts.

By the Iranian law, if the marriage is terminated through divorce, with the exception of limited cases, and only for short periods of time, in which alimony is assigned for the woman, she is economically subjected to a gloomy situation. Such situation is intensified when the divorced is asked by the woman or is the result of her fault. In these cases, the civil rights of some countries provide measures to protect women. Nevertheless, the Iranian Civil Code remains silent on this matter, although recently, based on a law ratified by the High Judiciary Council, in some marriage contracts a condition is inserted known as the condition to divide husband’s property. This condition, in part, satisfies the woman’s sustenance. This paper intends to compare this legal provision with a somewhat similar provision in the French law known as the shared property.